The benefits of yield curve control
If bringing short-term rates to zero isn’t enough the Fed has the option of yield curve control (YCC): i.e. the Fed would target some longer-term rate and pledge to buy enough long-term bonds to keep the rate from rising above its target. This would be one way for the Fed to stimulate the economy.
- The Bank of Japan (BOJ) committed in 2016 to peg yields on 10-year Japanese Government Bonds around zero percent, in a fight to boost persistently low inflation. To hit that yield target, the BOJ has a standing offer to purchase any outstanding bond at a price consistent with the target yield. On days when private investors for any reason are less willing to pay that price, the BOJ ends up purchasing more bonds in order to keep yields inside the target price range. Since the initiation of YCC, however, the BOJ has purchased government bonds at a slower pace showing that credible YCC policy can be more sustainable for central banks than a quantity-based asset purchase program.

- Australia’s central bank adopted a form of YCC in March 2020, in response to the coronavirus, and is targeting a three-year government bond yield of 0.25 percent.
- As far as the US is concerned, recent research suggests that pinning medium-term rates to a low level once the federal funds rate hits zero would help the economy recover faster after a recession. In particular, YCC could bring the unemployment rate down much faster early in the recovery. If investors believe the Fed will stick to the peg, the Fed could achieve lower interest rates without significantly expanding its balance sheet.
What is yield curve control?
By: Sage Belz, David Wessel – Brookings
The Federal Reserve’s Current Framework for Monetary Policy: A Review and Assessment
Authors: Janice C. Eberly, James H. Stock, Jonathan H. Wright
From: Northwestern University, Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University
A more nuanced look at the BOJ’s experience with YCC
YCC introduces arbitrage opportunities into otherwise arbitrage-free markets. This externality tends to diminish the effectiveness of the policy:
Due to counterparty risk (a market friction), these arbitrage opportunities can only be exploited by large financial institutions. And, as such, exploiting these arbitrage opportunities results in a wealth transfer from the BOJ to these financial institutions (not necessarily Japanese banks), analogous to a helicopter money drop.
It is important, therefore, to recognize and consider the implications of this wealth transfer to financial institutions generated by YCC.
The Distributional Effects of Yield Control Monetary Policy: A Helicopter Money Drop to Financial Institutions
Authors: Robert Jarrow, Sujan Lamichhane
From: Cornell University, Johns Hopkins University
A historical precedent in the US
In 1942, the Fed and Treasury internally agreed that the Treasury yield curve would be fixed for the duration of the war, anchored at the front end with a ⅜ percent bill rate and at the long end with a 2½ percent long-bond rate. Until around 1947, the Fed was able to maintain these pegs without having to buy up large amounts of bonds.
But exiting the policy proved to be challenging: the Fed first terminated the ⅜ percent fixed bill rate which caused bill yields to rise dramatically and triggered a reversal of the preference for bonds over bills. To cushion the reversal the Fed started buying bonds and selling bills. The Fed’s commitment to keep long-term Treasury yields below 2½ percent lasted for 10 years.
How the Fed Managed the Treasury Yield Curve in the 1940s
By: Kenneth D. Garbade – Federal Reserve Bank of New York