How much policy room is gained by an increase of the inflation target?
In this paper, L’Huillier and Schoenle examine whether an increase of the inflation target will proportionally increase the policy room for policymakers. Their main argument is that an increase in the inflation target will trigger a response from the private sector prompting firms to adjust prices more frequently with higher trend inflation. This claim is also supported empirically, as the authors show that there is a clear relationship between the frequency of price changes and trend inflation in the U.S. over the 1970–2015 period. L’Huillier and Schoenle use a 3-equation New Keynesian model which allows them to derive a set of simple theoretical results that highlight how increased price flexibility interacts with a higher target to yield a wedge between intended and effective policy rooms.
We show that the gains generated by this strategy are not one-to-one: Because a higher inflation target leads to a steeper Phillips curve, to effectively get, for instance, 2 percentage points of extra room, policymakers need to raise their inflation target from 2% to 5%. In fact, raising the target from 2% to 4% delivers an effective extra room significantly smaller than 2 percentage points.

Raising the Inflation Target: What Are the Effective Gains in Policy Room?
Authors: Jean-Paul L’Huillier, Raphael Schoenle
From: Brandeis University and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
A dynamic inflation target
Central banks are faced with a trade-off argue Clayton and Schaab: on one hand the commitment to a rule corrects inflationary bias, on the other hand, flexibility to set inflation allows the central bank to respond to private information about economic shocks. They propose a dynamic monetary policy game in the presence of persistent shocks and private information. As in L’Huillier and Schoenle above, the central bank faces a time consistency problem but in this paper, persistent shocks make the central bank’s private information persistent. This leads to additional information frictions because firms learn about the persistent state from the central bank, which they use to form inflation expectations.
Our main result is that a time-varying, dynamic inflation target mechanism implements the efficient, full-information commitment allocation. The dynamic inflation target is a two-parameter mechanism, featuring both a target level and a target flexibility. Together, they serve the dual role of correcting the time consistency problem and the information frictions that emerge with persistent private information.
A Theory of Dynamic Inflation Targets
Authors: Christopher Clayton, Andreas Schaab
From: Yale School of Management, Toulouse School of Economics