• Twitter
  • Search
e-axes

360° Econ View

The issues, the debates, and the research

  • Home
  • Useful Data
  • About
  • Contact
  • Home
  • Useful Data
  • About
  • Contact

Climate

How do banks adjust after a natural disaster?

Posted by e-axes on September 3, 2024

Read Next →

Climate

Is Economic Growth Compatible With Credible Climate Constraints?

Climate

Can Financial Markets and Economic Literacy Reshape the Politics of Climate? Action

Climate

The Cost of Inconsistent and Incredible Climate Policy

Local vs non local banks and natural disaster recovery

Justin Gallagher and Daniel Hartley investigate the impact of local banking concentration on credit allocation and economic recovery following natural disasters in the U.S. The authors use a county-level panel dataset from 1980 to 2014, which includes data on state-level Presidential Disaster Declarations, federal disaster assistance, and private sector lending. The primary sources include the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) for home loans, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for bank deposits. Finally, Gallagher and Hartley use a difference-in-differences model to estimate the impact of natural disasters on credit allocation and economic outcomes.

Key findings

  • Impact of Local Banking on Credit Allocation: The paper finds that regions with a higher concentration of local banks allocate less new credit following a natural disaster compared to regions with more non-local banks. This reduction in credit is more pronounced for low-income individuals.
  • Economic Recovery: Counties with a higher share of local banking experience weaker economic recovery post-disaster. This is reflected in lower levels of new credit, which can impede long-term economic redevelopment. On the other hand, non-local banks, due to their larger capacity and geographic diversification, are better positioned to provide necessary credit following disasters, contributing to more robust economic recovery.
  • Theoretical Framework: The authors discuss three main predictions regarding local banks: they have less capacity to lend due to limited geographic diversification, a greater incentive to lend to support local recovery, and an informational advantage in assessing local credit risk. However, the capacity constraint appears to dominate, leading to less credit provision in regions with more local banking.


Natural Disasters, Local Bank Market Share, and Economic Recovery
Authors: Justin Gallagher , Daniel Hartley
From: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Bank competition and natural disaster recovery

In this paper, Kim et al. explore how competition among banks influences their strategic adaptation to climate risks, particularly in the context of limited regulatory oversight. The authors focus on how banks learn about and respond to climate risks, using the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey as a case study. They used confidential supervisory data on home equity lines of credit, combined with high-resolution flood risk projections, to analyze how banks updated their risk models following Hurricane Harvey. The study employed a difference-in-differences approach to identify changes in banks’ risk assessments and lending behaviors, focusing on areas outside the direct impact of the hurricane to isolate learning effects from local economic shocks.

Key Findings

  • Heterogeneous Learning and Adaptation: Banks exhibit different levels of learning about climate risks, which affects their adaptation strategies. Banks with greater exposure to Hurricane Harvey were more likely to update their internal risk models to account for future flood risks, even in areas not directly affected by the hurricane. This suggests that banks with more exposure had informational advantages that informed their risk assessments.
  • Impact of Competition: The study finds that competition influences banks’ adaptation behaviors. In less competitive markets, banks with higher exposure to Hurricane Harvey reduced lending in areas with higher flood risks. However, in more competitive markets, these banks were less likely to adapt, suggesting that competitive pressures may encourage risk-taking over risk mitigation.
  • Strategic Complementarity: The adaptation behavior of banks is influenced by the actions of their competitors. Banks are more likely to adapt when their competitors also adapt, indicating a strategic complementarity. This suggests that banks may be less concerned about losing market share if they expect their competitors to also reduce risky lending.
  • Policy implications: Kim et al. suggest that policy measures should consider both microprudential and macroprudential aspects, as the adaptation strategies of individual banks can have broader systemic implications.


Bank Competition and Strategic Adaptation to Climate Change
Authors: Dasol Kim, Luke M. Olson, Toan Phan
From: Office of Financial Research, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Comparison of the two papers

  • Kim et al. argue that competition can lead to strategic adaptation among banks, where banks are less likely to adapt if their competitors do not. This strategic complementarity can lead to a collective underestimation of risks.
  • Gallagher and Hartley do not focus on competition per se but rather on the capacity and incentives of local versus non-local banks, suggesting that non-local banks are better positioned to support recovery due to their larger capacity and geographic diversification.
Print Friendly, PDF & Email

e-axes

Read Next →

Climate

Is Economic Growth Compatible With Credible Climate Constraints?

Climate

Can Financial Markets and Economic Literacy Reshape the Politics of Climate? Action

Climate

The Cost of Inconsistent and Incredible Climate Policy

Comments are Closed

Account

  • Login

Subscriptions

You are not logged in.
Login
Subscribe

Subscriptions

Subscribe

Most Read

  • Bank Heterogeneity and the Transmission of Monetary Tightening
  • Central Bank Losses and Public Debt: Constraints on Inflation Control
  • AI Valuations, Capital Investment, and Growth
  • How Firms’ Cost Expectations Shape Prices
  • Communicating Uncertainty: Fan Charts, Confidence, and Credibility
  • The AI Infrastructure Boom: Productive Investment or Financial Fragility?
  • Macroeconomic Risk: From Scenario Synthesis to Distributional Transmission
  • Measuring Expectations in Real Time: The Value and Limits of Kalshi Markets
  • Measuring Global Tensions Using AI
  • When Markets Drift from the Real Economy

Sections

  • AI
  • Banking
  • Books
  • Brexit
  • CBDC
  • China
  • Climate
  • COVID-19
  • Crypto
  • Demographics
  • Economic Growth
  • Economic Science
  • Economics of Information
  • Emerging Markets
  • Eurozone
  • Financial Markets
  • Geoeconomics
  • Geopolitics
  • India
  • Inequality
  • Inflation
  • International Economics
  • Macro
  • Markets
  • Monetary Policy
  • Oil
  • Politics & Economics
  • Taxation
  • Tech
  • Trade
  • U.S.
  • Ukraine-Russia War
  • Uncategorized
  • Useful Data

© 2026 e-axes

  • Privacy Policy & Terms of Service

Theme by Anders Norén

This website uses cookies to improve your experience. We'll assume you're ok with this, but you can opt-out if you wish.
Cookie settingsAccept
Privacy & Cookies Policy

Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these cookies, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are as essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website. These cookies will be stored in your browser only with your consent. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. But opting out of some of these cookies may have an effect on your browsing experience.
Necessary
Always Enabled
Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly. This category only includes cookies that ensures basic functionalities and security features of the website. These cookies do not store any personal information.
SAVE & ACCEPT