Protectionism and welfare
Ravikumar et al., in this paper, attempt to answer the question of whether the losses from protectionist policies are equal to the gains from liberalization policies. Towards this goal, they develop a neoclassical model of capital accumulation with trade. They impose two crucial assumptions: a) trade is balanced in every period, and b) the change in trade costs in the two steady states, the “observed” or open and the “autarky,” are symmetric. The second assumption allows the authors to study any asymmetries that emerge solely from transitional dynamics. They find that along the transition path from “observed” to “autarky”:
- In the long run, the investment rate is invariant to the trade regime so changes in consumption are identical to changes in income.
- The share of income allocated to consumption varies along the transition path.
- Asymmetry in capital accumulation accounts for the largest share of the asymmetry between dynamic gains and losses, followed by asymmetry in consumption rates.
- Overall, losses from protectionism are smaller than the gains from liberalization.
The intuition behind their result is that “following protectionism, the economy can coast off of previously accumulated capital stock, so higher trade costs do not imply large losses immediately.”

Trade Liberalization versus Protectionism: Dynamic Welfare Asymmetries
Authors: B. Ravikumar, Ana Maria Santacreu, Michael J. Sposi
From: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Southern Methodist University
Protectionism and the role of the dollar
In this paper, Chahrour and Valchev explore how the emergence of two distinct trade blocs (a U.S.-centric and a China-centric), changes the incentives for coordinating on a common international currency. More specifically, they explore how far this bifurcation would need to go to pose a threat to the special role of the dollar in international exchange. The authors extend the model by Chahrour and Valchec (2021) by including a situation in which emerging trade frictions can give rise to fragmentation of trade flows and currency choice.
We find that unilateral protectionism on the part of the US could modestly reinforce the dollar’s dominant role, but that policies directly supporting the Chinese yuan’s use in trade could end the dollar’s continued dominance if implemented over a long-enough period. Tit-for-tat responses between just the US and China would likely leave the dollar’s role essentially unchanged. If both countries coordinate protectionist policies within their trading blocs, however, a transition away from global dollar dominance becomes far more likely.
Authors: Ryan Chahrour, Rosen Valchev
From: Cornell University, Boston College