The Brexit deal

In June 2016 we narrowly voted to Leave, when the Leave campaign claimed Turkey was about to join the EU and we would have more spending on public services if we left, in a campaign that used money that exceeded election rules the origins of which are still unclear. We now know that Turkey joining the EU is not on the horizon, according to the OBR there will be less money available for public services after we leave, and we will have to end up paying and obeying with no say over the rules. According to the latest large poll two thirds of people want a say on the withdrawal agreement and there is a clear majority to Remain.

The direction of travel is towards a customs union for the whole UK. If talks break down, the UK will be in a bare-bones customs union, thanks to the backstop. A customs union is in the EU’s interest, because it maximises the territorial extent of its tariff regime, providing it with a larger market to sell to other countries in their own trade negotiations. A customs union is now the baseline for the future relationship, and soft Brexiters can press for full single market participation to complement a customs union during the transition.

[T]he ageing of the electorate will partly cancel out the replacement of older Eurosceptic cohorts with newer, better-educated, more pro European cohorts. But the balance of these two effects is small relative to the age-turnout gradient and the volatility and uncertainty surrounding period effects. It follows that demographic trends are unlikely to be the decisive determinants of future changes in European sentiment. Rather, changes in nationwide attitudes and in the age-turnout gradient will be key.