EU’s Banking Union nine years after its launch
Ignazio Angeloni in this commentary looks at how EU’s Banking Union has succeeded at achieving its goals, namely a) to strengthen the European banking system by eliminating inefficient lenders; and b) to facilitate the rise of a small number of pan-continental banks, globally competitive and capable of supporting the international activities of European firms.
As far as its first goal is concerned, some progress has been made in dealing with banks near bankruptcy mostly through mergers and acquisitions. Yet the recent European Banking Authority and ECB stress tests indicated that there are still many weak banks in the Eurozone. As far as its second goal is concerned, Angeloni argues that the Banking Union has failed:
The second goal was squarely missed; ten years ago, there were three continental European banks among the eight largest globally, measured by assets. Today there are none.
Three ways to fix European Banking Union
By: Ignazio Angeloni – Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE
Unexpected benefits of the Banking Union
Progress has been made argue Farnè and Vouldis in unexpected ways. They look at a dataset of 270 banks operating in the euro area and examine how banks’ credit risk evolved starting for the period of 2014 until 2019. The period is significant because it was in 2014 that the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was established and put the ’Significant institutions’ of the participating member states under the supervision of the ECB. In addition, data on non-performing-loans (NPLs) was harmonized across countries, following common risk and solvency definitions, thus facilitating a cross-country analysis like the one the authors are conducting. They find:
Overall, our results show that, in the aftermath of the euro area financial crisis and the setting up of a supranational supervisor, banks’ size is negatively related to risk-taking. On average, larger banks tend to reduce their NPL ratios more compared to smaller banks after controlling for other country- and bank-specific factors. A supranational supervisor seems to be effective in reducing banks’ risk-taking due to enhanced organisational capacity rather than through incentive alignment of banks with the supervisors.

Banks’ risk-taking within a banking union
Authors: Matteo Farnè, Angelos Vouldis
From: ECB