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Inflation

Political Identity Distorts Inflation Expectations

Posted by e-axes on October 14, 2025

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Political identity and inflation expectations

Rupal Kamdar, Walker Ray, and Mauricio Ulate examine how political identity shapes both individual and higher-order beliefs (beliefs regarding others’ expectations) about inflation expectations in the United States. The authors conducted three waves of surveys between mid-2023 and April 2025 using Prolific, an online sampling platform. Each survey included approximately 600-1,800 respondents, stratified equally among Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.

Survey Waves:

  1. Wave 1 (July/September 2023): Focused on information treatments from partisan news sources during Biden’s presidency
  2. Wave 2 (November 2024): Conducted around the presidential election to examine conditional beliefs based on electoral outcomes
  3. Wave 3 (April 2025): Following Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs announcement to assess beliefs under different tariff scenarios

Findings

  • Partisan gap in inflation expectations: The research confirms that supporters of the sitting president consistently report lower inflation expectations than opposition supporters. During Biden’s presidency, Republicans expected inflation roughly 2 percentage points higher than Democrats. After Trump’s 2024 election victory, this gap reversed, with Republicans reporting expectations 3-4 percentage points lower than Democrats.
  • Systematic overestimation of political disagreement: While respondents correctly understand the direction of partisan differences, they consistently overestimate their magnitude by approximately double. In 2023, the actual partisan gap was 2 percentage points, but perceptions exceeded 4 percentage points. By 2025, actual gaps of 3-4 percentage points were perceived as exceeding 8 percentage points.
  • Self-perception as moderate: Individuals across all parties view their own inflation expectations as more moderate than their partisan peers, positioning their personal forecasts between what they believe Democrats and Republicans expect. This pattern suggests people see themselves as less extreme than their own party members.
  • Information effects: Factual reporting compressed belief distributions toward reported information regardless of source or party affiliation. However, information treatments had minimal impact on higher-order beliefs about what others expect.


We Think That They Think: Political Affiliation and Higher-Order Beliefs
Authors: Rupal Kamdar, Walker Ray, Mauricio Ulate
From: Indiana University, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

The 2024 election effect: measuring partisan splits in inflation expectations

In this paper, Matthew DiGiuseppe, Ana Carolina Garriga, and Andreas Kern focus specifically on the 2024 election transition, looking at immediate electoral effects, while the Kamdar et al. paper above provides longitudinal analysis from 2023-2025 across multiple political events including the 2024 election and Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs. Both papers reach the same conclusions.

DiGiuseppe et al. fielded their first survey wave on August 6, 2024, shortly after Kamala Harris replaced Joe Biden on the Democratic ticket, and conducted the second wave between November 19 and December 8, 2024, approximately two weeks after the election. Using the Prolific platform as well, they recruited a quota sample of 1,500 respondents reflecting US population demographics by age, gender, region, and partisanship, with 1,135 completing both waves. Respondents were asked to estimate inflation/deflation rates over the next 12 months.

Findings

  • Partisan divergence: Democrats’ inflation expectations increased by approximately 2.7 percentage points after Trump’s victory, while Republicans’ expectations decreased by 4.88 percentage points to -1.74%
  • Magnitude of change: Both Democratic and Republican partisans changed their inflation expectations by approximately 5 percentage points in opposite directions following the election outcome
  • Gender gap: Women updated their inflation expectations by larger magnitudes than men, with Democratic women expecting higher inflation and Republican women expecting lower inflation than their male counterparts
  • Education effect: College graduates reported smaller updates in expectations compared to those without degrees
  • Strong partisanship: Individuals with stronger partisan identification were more likely to update their inflation expectations, while affective polarization showed mixed results

Partisan Bias in Inflation Expectations: Evidence from the 2024 US Election
Authors: Matthew DiGiuseppe, Ana Carolina Garriga, Andreas Kern
From: Leiden University, University of Essex, Georgetown University

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Read Next →

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