Zero-sum thinking and political and policy views
In this paper, Chinoy et al. explore how a “zero-sum” perception of the world, defined as the perception that the gains of some are invariably the losses of others, are impacting redistribution, racial and gender discrimination and immigration policies. The authors use a new survey of a representative sample of 20,400 U.S. residents, and measure zero-sum thinking, political preferences, and policy views. They find:
- Zero-sum thinking is not primarily a partisan issue, but helps explain variation in views within political parties. For example: Among Democrats, those with more zero-sum views tend to be more anti-immigration. Among Republicans, those with more zero-sum views tend to be more supportive of redistribution.
- Economic mobility: Greater intergenerational upward mobility is associated with less zero-sum thinking.
- Immigration: Having recent immigrant ancestors and growing up in areas with historically high immigrant populations are associated with less zero-sum thinking.
- Younger cohorts tend to have more zero-sum views, which may be related to experiencing less economic growth in their lifetimes compared to older generations.
- Zero-sum thinking helps explain some puzzling political preferences, like why some groups who would benefit from redistribution oppose it, while others who would pay for it support it.
- The effects of zero-sum thinking on policy views remain significant even when controlling for other factors like beliefs about luck vs. effort, moral universalism, and trust.
Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides
Authors: Sahil Chinoy, Nathan Nunn, Sandra Sequeira, Stefanie Stantcheva
From: Harvard University, University of British Columbia, London School of Economics
Political convergence in U.S. and French elections
In this paper, Di Telia et al. examine whether politicians’ positions and policies correspond to voter preferences. The authors focus on elections with two rounds in the U.S. (the primary and the general election) and in France (the first and second rounds of the general election) because “two-round elections enable to observe the same candidate in the same year, but targeting two different sets of voters.” They use text analysis to locate candidate platforms on the left-right axis before the first round (or primary election) and then again before the second round and also analyze the level of complexity of these platforms. Di Telia et al. use a novel dataset of candidate websites for U.S. House elections, from 2002-2016, and manifestos for French parliamentary and local elections, from 1958-2022. Some of their findings include:
- Candidates move toward the ideological center between the first round (or primary) and second round (or general election) in both U.S. House elections and French parliamentary/local elections.
- Candidates strategically adjust their platforms to converge toward their opponent who narrowly qualified for the final round, compared to a runner-up who narrowly failed to qualify. Specifically:
In the U.S., convergence is primarily driven by adjustments in linguistic complexity.
In France, convergence is mainly driven by ideological adjustments.
The overall effect size of convergence to the opponent is 0.41 standard deviations in U.S. elections and 0.30 standard deviations in French elections. - Candidates adjust their platforms more when facing stronger opponents who pose a greater electoral threat (e.g. incumbents or candidates from parties that performed well previously).
- More experienced and successful politicians (e.g. incumbents, those who received more votes in the first round) tend to adjust their platforms more, even though they may need it less.
- The extent of strategic convergence has increased over time, with larger effects observed after 2008 in both countries.
Keep your Enemies Closer: Strategic Platform Adjustments during U.S. and French Elections
Authors: Rafael Di Tella, Randy Kotti, Caroline Le Pennec, Vincent Pons
From: Harvard Business School, HEC Montreal
