Maybe Central Banks Are Too Independent
By: Narayana Kocherlakota – University of Rochester
Central Bank Independence, financial instability and politics: new evidence for OECD and non-OECD countries
Authors: Barbara Pistoresi, Maddalena Cavicchioli, Giulio Brevini
From: University of Modena and Reggio Emilia – University of Verona
As the mandate of Central Banks expands, becomes more complicated and “fuzzier” accountability becomes necessary to ensure legitimacy, argue Goodhart and Lastra. In particular, they foresee the delegation of macro-prudential supervision to Central Banks to become controversial as it is hard to monitor whether the authorities are “on the right track”. Finally they advocate the judicial review of Central Bank actions and decisions.
Populism and Central Bank Independence
Authors:Charles A Goodhart, Rosa Lastra
From: London School of Economics – Queen Mary University of London
The Politics of Central Bank Independence
Authors: Jakob de Haan, Sylvester Eijffinger
From: University of Groningen – Tilburg University
