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Monetary Policy

Historical patterns in central banking

Posted by e-axes on November 15, 2022

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How central banks have used their balance sheets through history

This paper by Ferguson et al. provides historical data aggregating trends, drivers, and the full range of policy precedents associated with central bank balance sheets. Their analysis is based on a new empirical dataset that reconstructs central bank balance sheets for advanced economies over multiple centuries using primary and secondary sources, on an annual basis, including the full breakdown of asset and liability components for most of history. Some of their findings include:

  • Contrary to common beliefs that central banks were “passive” prior to the 1970s, Ferguson et al. show that the most recent balance sheet expansions are dwarfed by central bank activity during the first era of globalization while involvement in government debt markets has been stronger during many episodes.
  • Balance sheets relative to aggregate output have reached exceptional levels in the post-2008 era, but the picture is much more mundane when scaling central bank assets to the size of the financial sector.
  • Liquidity provisions during financial stress induce moral hazard dynamics. While liquidity provisions support the economy and hasten recoveries in the short run, they also substantially shorten the time to the next crisis, probably because banks “feel that downward risks of risky investment strategies are capped by a publicly-provisioned “safety tool” in the form of central bank liquidity.”


Central Bank balance Sheets and the Macroeconomy, 1587-2020
Authors: Niall Ferguson, Martin Kornejew, Paul Schmelzing, Moritz Schularick
From: Stanford University, University of Bonn, Yale School of Management, Sciences Po

Are central banks truly independent?

De jure central bank independence (CBI) does not necessarily translate into actual or defacto CBI, argue Ioannidou et al. in this paper. They collect systematic biographical information, international press coverage, and independent expert opinions to examine whether central bank governor appointments have become more, or less political, following significant institutional reforms aiming to insulate the central bank and its governor from political interference. The authors look at 316 central bank governor appointments in 57 countries between 1985 and 2020.

We do not find that governor appointments have become more independent as the legal framework determining the degree of central bank independence improves. Moreover, we show that governor appointments are even more political following reforms granting central banks operational independence. Further results indicate that politically-motivated governor appointments are associated with lack of de facto independence. All in all, our findings suggest that governments actively seek to undo the goal of these reforms by using the appointment process politically.

(In)dependent Central Banks
Authors: Vasso Ioannidou, Thomas Lambert, Sotirios Kokas, Alexander Michaelides
From: City University of London, Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Essex, Imperial College London

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Monetary Policy

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How Firms Adjust Their Investment Decisions to Fed Policy

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