Polarization and misinformation
In this paper Jann and Schottmuller develop a framework, where everybody has different information and different preferences, in order to analyze strategic communication among players, . In their model segregation into small, homogeneous groups can be individually rational and Pareto-efficient, as it maximizes the amount of communication that takes place. They find that:
Information dispersion and preference polarization work in opposite directions: The former makes individuals curious about learning each other’s information so they can make better choices; the latter gives them an incentive to misrepresent their information in order to influence others’ choices. If the polarization of preferences increases in any given group, individuals become more and more interested in misleading each other and truthful communication becomes harder although individuals are still just as much interested in learning from one another. This means that in a highly polarized society in which everybody tries to learn from everyone, very little truthful communication may be possible.
Why Echo Chambers are Useful
Authors: Ole Jann, Christoph Schottmuller ¨
From: CERGE-EI, University of Cologne
How polarization persists
In this paper Kieren and Weber conduct an experimental study in which they investigate how agents process signals which are vacuous of any real information about the objective state of the world but which are reinforcing their previous beliefs. Their results suggest:
- Individuals strongly and systematically update their prior beliefs after observing signals that are uninformative of the objective state of the world;
- Individuals fail to correctly identify that uninformative signals do not carry information about the objective state of the world and update their beliefs based on the valence of the signal relative to their current prior expectations;
- Individuals form and entertain false beliefs in environments where potentially new information is easily accessible but costly to
verify (e.g. online media)
Expectation Formation under Uninformative Signals
Authors: Pascal Kieren, Martin Weber
From: University of Mannheim
