What type of resolution framework could incentivize distressed banks and its creditors to negotiate and restructure its liabilities before the bank fails?
Financial Restructuring and Resolution of Banks
Authors:Jean-Edouard Colliard, Denis Gromb
From: HEC Paris
Do government guarantees on bank liabilities entail a moral hazard effect that increases bank risk taking? Yes, argue Cordella and al. but only if the proportion of bank debt-holders, who can price risk at the margin, is large.
Government guarantees, transparency, and bank risk-taking
Authors: Tito Cordella, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Robert Marquez
From: World bank, IMF, UC Davis
When are bail-in strategies credible? It depends on the structure of interbank networks.
Bail-ins and Bail-outs: Incentives, Connectivity, and Systemic Stability
Authors: Benjamin Bernard, Agostino Capponi, Joseph E. Stiglitz
From: UCLA, Columbia University
