• Twitter
  • Search
e-axes

360° Econ View

The issues, the debates, and the research

  • Home
  • Useful Data
  • About
  • Contact
  • Home
  • Useful Data
  • About
  • Contact

AI

AI Valuations and Private Credit

Posted by e-axes on August 19, 2026

Read Next →

AI

Rethinking Markets in the Age of AI Agents

AI

The AI Measurement Problem: When Markets Price What Firms Can’t Easily Disclose

AI

AI Financial Advice: How Good Is It, and Is It Fair?

Banks and the AI boom: Measuring direct exposure

In this paper, Greg Cohen, Cooper Killen, and Simon Lau explore how exposed are large US banks to losses from the AI investment boom, and specifically, what is the “tail risk” if AI spending or AI company valuations were to collapse?

The authors use data primarily from FR Y-14Q Schedule H (loan-level regulatory filings from large US banks with $100bn+ in assets) and FR Y-9C for capital/asset figures, supplemented by third-party estimates from JPMorgan, MSCI Real Capital Analytics, CBRE, and S&P Global. Borrowers are sorted into “AI-adjacent” industries (software, energy, semiconductors) using NAICS codes, then exposure is measured as a share of total commitments and tier 1 capital, split further by credit rating and delinquency status. Rather than a formal quantitative stress test, the authors use qualitative tail-risk scenarios to reason through how losses could cascade across interconnected AI sectors, while explicitly excluding indirect exposure (e.g., via private credit funds) due to data limitations.

Findings

  • Direct exposure is currently modest: outstanding commercial and industrial (C&I) loans to AI-adjacent industries average just 0.8% of total bank assets, with delinquency rates in line with banks’ overall portfolios.
  • Committed exposure is much higher than outstanding: averaging 25% of tier 1 capital, meaning losses could spike quickly if stressed borrowers draw down credit lines before defaulting.
  • Software lending is the weakest link: 26% of commitments to software companies (about $50 billion) are rated B or below, reflecting reliance on continued equity injections rather than cash flow to fund AI spending.
  • Interconnection risk is significant: a pullback by software companies could cascade into semiconductor manufacturers, energy providers, and data centers simultaneously, causing correlated rather than isolated losses.
  • Data centers carry added risks: high upfront capital costs, potential technological obsolescence, and difficulty finding replacement tenants given specialized property design.
  • Analysis likely understates total risk: it excludes indirect exposure through lending to nonbank financial institutions like private credit funds that finance AI investments, a channel flagged as important but too hard to quantify with current data.


Tail Risk for Banks Posed by Investments in Generative Artificial Intelligence
Authors: Greg Cohen, Cooper Killen, Simon Lau
From: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

 

Until August 21, enjoy complimentary access to our newsletter, which curates and highlights cutting-edge economic research that analyzes the key dynamics shaping today’s economy. If you find it valuable, consider an annual subscription: for $100, you will receive 147 editions delivered directly to your inbox.

AI and private credit

This FSB report identifies private credit as playing a “critical role” in financing the AI infrastructure boom, particularly data center construction driven by generative AI (GenAI) demand for high-performance computing. As internal cash flows from technology companies have proven insufficient to cover the scale of capital required, asset-based finance (ABF) has become a key funding source, leveraging predictable, long-term revenue streams such as data centre leases.

  • Scale of the financing gap: AI infrastructure capex is projected at $2.9 trillion between 2025 and 2028, with $1.5 trillion expected to come from external capital rather than internal company cash flow.
  • Rising concentration: AI’s share of total private credit deals reached 34% in 2025, up sharply from an average of just 17% over the prior five years, indicating fast-growing sector concentration.
  • Loan characteristics: Loans to AI companies broadly mirror terms seen in other sectors (similar maturities and rate spreads) but tend to be larger in scale given the capital intensity of data centre projects.
  • Contained but growing exposure: The report notes that exposure to AI-related sectors currently remains relatively small for the average private credit fund, but “interest and activity in this area have been steadily growing over time”.

This sits within the report’s broader concentration-risk discussion: private credit loan originations remain focused in a handful of industries (technology, healthcare, services), and this specialization reduces diversification and increases exposure to sector-specific shocks, of which AI is now a prominent example. The report frames this as part of its wider warning that private credit “remains untested” at its current size and scope, meaning a downturn in AI-related revenue or valuations could expose leverage and credit-quality vulnerabilities that have not yet been tested through a full economic cycle.


Report on Vulnerabilities in Private Credit
From: Financial Stability Board

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

e-axes

Read Next →

AI

Rethinking Markets in the Age of AI Agents

AI

The AI Measurement Problem: When Markets Price What Firms Can’t Easily Disclose

AI

AI Financial Advice: How Good Is It, and Is It Fair?

Comments are Closed

Account

  • Login

Subscriptions

You are not logged in.
Login
Subscribe

Subscriptions

Subscribe

Most Read

  • When Debt Erodes Central Bank Independence
  • Decomposing Treasury Supply Shocks: Volume, Maturity, and Monetary Equivalence
  • AI Valuations and Private Credit
  • Why the Fed Sold Euros, Not Dollars: A Portfolio Balance Reading of the 2026 Yen Intervention
  • New and Noteworthy Books in Economics (August)
  • From Information to Liquidity: How Stablecoins Reshape Bank Intermediation
  • Why Firms Choose the U.S. And What Europe Could Do About It
  • Rethinking Markets in the Age of AI Agents
  • The AI Measurement Problem: When Markets Price What Firms Can’t Easily Disclose
  • How Firms Adjust Their Investment Decisions to Fed Policy

Sections

  • AI
  • Banking
  • Books
  • Brexit
  • CBDC
  • China
  • Climate
  • COVID-19
  • Crypto
  • Demographics
  • Economic Growth
  • Economic Science
  • Economics of Information
  • Emerging Markets
  • Eurozone
  • Financial Markets
  • Geoeconomics
  • Geopolitics
  • India
  • Inequality
  • Inflation
  • International Economics
  • Macro
  • Markets
  • Monetary Policy
  • Oil
  • Politics & Economics
  • Taxation
  • Tech
  • Trade
  • U.S.
  • Ukraine-Russia War
  • Uncategorized
  • Useful Data

© 2026 e-axes

  • Privacy Policy & Terms of Service

Theme by Anders Norén

This website uses cookies to improve your experience. We'll assume you're ok with this, but you can opt-out if you wish.
Cookie settingsAccept
Privacy & Cookies Policy

Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these cookies, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are as essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website. These cookies will be stored in your browser only with your consent. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. But opting out of some of these cookies may have an effect on your browsing experience.
Necessary
Always Enabled
Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly. This category only includes cookies that ensures basic functionalities and security features of the website. These cookies do not store any personal information.
SAVE & ACCEPT