The new version of the Climate Club
In 2015, William Nordhaus put forth the idea of a Climate Club as a solution to the free-riding problem which characterizes international climate agreements. He advocated a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants which could induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement.
Recently, the G7 has announced the launch of a new version of a Climate Club. The “open, cooperative international Climate Club” will foster coordinated action to achieve the Paris climate agreement’s maximum-warming target of 1.5° Celsius without leaving anyone at a competitive disadvantage. It will be modelled along four main principles:
- International climate action needs to be broad-based and consistent, with all club members aiming for the same objectives;
- Countries should be allowed to pursue these common objectives in their own ways, as long as everyone abides by “a uniform measurement of CO2 content of products and materials;”
- Developing countries should receive support to achieve the common objective;
- Having to compete against cheaper, more carbon-intensive methods should not put “climate policy pioneers” at a disadvantage in the global marketplace.
By encouraging countries to shape their climate policies in accordance with their socioeconomic realities, the Climate Club is well positioned to avoid some of the problems that led to the gilets jaunes.
All Are Welcome at the Climate Club
By: Avram Alpert, Dennis J. Snower – Princeton University, University of Oxford
A couple of issues to consider
Van Asselt and Newell are as well in support of a club arrangement covering particular fossil fuel sources and groups of actors that, over time, will give rise to growing calls for a more coordinated and multilateral response. In this paper they discuss issues to consider for the creation of such club:
- As clubs can be characterized by limited institutionalization, it is possible to put in place mechanisms to track progress (e.g., regular reports by members, or independent reviews), in order to exert some pressure on domestic policy making;
- It is important to understand how such a club should grow to bring on board “reluctant” countries which in this case means major fossil fuel producers;
- Members would need excludable benefits or much like Nordhaus suggested, the Climate Club should impose sanctions on nonmembers;
- Finally, the club model could easily bring subnational and nonstate actors—such as cities, regions, NGOs, and businesses—into the fold. Involving subnational and nonstate actors can help move an international coalition on fossil fuel supply forward, particularly where federal governments are unwilling to do so.
Pathways to an International Agreement to Leave Fossil Fuels in the Ground
Authors: Harro van Asselt, Peter Newell
From: University of Eastern Finland Law School, University of Sussex
